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The Conrail "Arguably Justified" Test and a
Public Employer's Unilateral Imposition of
an Unconstitutional Drug Testing Program
Under the Railway Labor Act
Jonathan Savart
The Railway Labor Act 1 ("RLA") imposes obligations on railway and airline employers to bargain with employee unions over
pay, workplace rules, and working conditions. The RLA divides
employer-employee disputes into two categories, which the courts
have termed "major disputes" and "minor disputes."2 A major
dispute arises when an employer unilaterally attempts to
"change the rates of pay, rules or working conditions of its employees ...

except in the manner prescribed in [existing collective

bargaining] agreements."3 A major dispute must be resolved
through an often long and arduous process of bargaining and
mediation.4 Minor disputes, which involve a party's "interpretation or application of [existing] agreements concerning rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions,"5 are subject to compulsory
and binding arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment
Board ("NRAB").6 Significantly, during a major dispute a court
must grant an injunction preserving the pre-dispute status quo
until the dispute is resolved,7 but during a minor dispute the
pre-dispute status quo is not similarly preserved.8

t A.B. 1992, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 1995, University of Chicago.
45 USC § 151 et seq (1988).
2 See, for example, Consolidated Rail Corp. v Railway Labor Executives' Association,
491 US 299 (1989) ("Conrail").
3 45 USC § 152(7) (1988).
45 USC § 156 (1988).
45 USC § 152(6) (1988).
6 45 USC § 153(1)(i) (1988).
7 45 USC § 156. See Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v Transportation Union, 396 US 142
(1969) (upholding an injunction to maintain the pre-dispute status quo during arbitration
of a major dispute).
' Conrail, 491 US at 304. Compare Locomotive Engineers v Missouri.K.T Railroad
Co., 363 US 528, 531 (1960) (noting that during a minor dispute the employer is not
obliged to preserve the pre-dispute status quo).,
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In ConsolidatedRail Corp. v Railway Labor Executives' Association,9 the Supreme Court established the standard for determining whether an employer-employee dispute is "major" or "minor" under the RLA. The Court held that a dispute is minor if
either party can "arguably justify" the disputed action under the
existing agreement. ° Applying the "arguably justified" test, the
Conrail Court held that the railroad's unilateral inclusion of urinalysis drug screening in all periodic and return-from-leave physical examinations of employees constituted a minor dispute to be
arbitrated before the NRAB."1 The result of the Court's determination was to keep the drug testing program in effect pending
the NRAB's resolution of the dispute.12 Significantly, because
the union did not allege irreparable injury in its request for preliminary injunctive relief, the Court explicitly declined to resolve
whether an injunction based on a claim of irreparable injury
would be appropriate. 3
The Supreme Court's decision in Conrail does not prescribe
the appropriate response to a public employer's 4 unilateral imposition of an unconstitutional policy of purely random, mandatory, and suspicionless drug testing of its employees. 5 Two preConrail Supreme Court decisions suggest that absent a compelling interest such as public safety, such a testing program would
violate employees' Fourth Amendment right to remain free of un-

9

491 US 299 (1989).

'0 Id at 307.

" Id at 320.
12 Id at 320.
13 Conrail, 491 US at 304
14 This Comment focuses

n 5.
upon the actions of public sector employers subject to the

RLA. Such employers may not unilaterally act in a way that infringes upon their
employees' constitutional rights. A private sector employee is protected in this manner
only where the private employer's actions constitute "public action" because of heavy government regulation. See generally Survey of the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U
Miami L Rev 553, 567-609 (1988) (discussing the constitutional implications of employee
drug testing); Note, Mandatory Drug Testing of Public Sector Employees: Constitutional
Implications, 65 U Detroit L Rev 315 (1988).
15 This Comment addresses in particular the imposition of a purely random, manda-

tory, and suspicionless drug testing program because, under two recent Supreme Court
decisions, such a testing program is clearly unconstitutional. See Part III of this Comment. "Purely random" means that the test does not distinguish between workers in safety-sensitive positions and those in non-safety-sensitive positions. "Mandatory" means that
the employees must submit to the testing. "Suspicionless" means that the employer has
no reasonable grounds for suspecting an employee's drug use. Finally, the hypothetical
contemplates that the employer has unilaterally imposed the unconstitutional testing
program over the objections of the employees.
For a further discussion of the reasons that the testing program is unconstitutional
and the relevance of these factors, see Part III of this Comment.
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reasonable searches and seizures. 6 Under Conrail, however, a
court might determine that, given practice, usage, and custom, a
public employer's unilateral imposition of such a program constitutes a minor dispute. Because the pre-dispute status quo is
not preserved during a minor dispute, the employer's drug testing program would remain in effect pending the NRAB's resolution of the dispute. In the interim, the program would violate the
employees' Fourth Amendment rights.
This Comment argues that the Conrail "arguably justified"
test does not adequately protect employees' Fourth Amendment
rights when a public employer unilaterally imposes a purely random, mandatory, and suspicionless drug test. This Comment
therefore proposes that a court faced with this issue should adopt
a presumption that a disputed unconstitutional program is not
"arguably justified" and thus that the dispute is major, thereby
preserving the pre-dispute status quo and protecting employees
from deprivation of their constitutional rights.
Part I of this Comment examines the distinction between
major and minor disputes under the RLA. Part II describes the
Conrail"arguably justified" test for distinguishing between major
and minor disputes, noting that the Conrail Court declined to
decide whether preliminary injunctive relief to preserve the predispute status quo would be appropriate during a minor dispute.
Part III argues that a public employer's imposition of a purely random, mandatory, and suspicionless drug testing program
violates its employees' Fourth Amendment right to remain free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Part III also observes
that because deprivation of employees' constitutional rights constitutes irreparable injury, a preliminary injunction is ordinarily
the appropriate remedy. After Conrail, however, a disagreement
over such a test might constitute a minor dispute, allowing the
program to continue during NRAB arbitration.
Part IV then examines cases addressing whether a court may
grant a preliminary injunction preserving the pre-dispute status
quo pending the NRAB's disposition of a minor dispute where
constitutional rights are implicated. Part IV argues that once a
court characterizes a dispute as minor, it may not subsequently
"
Skinner v Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 US 602, 616-21 (1989) (suggesting the unconstitutionality of requiring public sector employees to submit to a mandatory drug and alcohol testing program absent a compelling governmental interest); National Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab, 489 US 656, 665 (1989) (requiring that a
mandatory drug testing program of public sector employees comport with the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment).
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grant a preliminary injunction because it no longer retains jurisdiction over the dispute.
Part V concludes that a court faced with this issue should
adopt a presumption that a disputed unconstitutional program is
not "arguably justified" and thus that the dispute is major. Even
though a court may desire to protect employees from a possible
violation of their constitutional rights by enjoining further testing
pending NRAB resolution of the dispute, the court may not enjoin the program after classifying the dispute as minor because it
no longer retains jurisdiction over the dispute. Because a court
should not determine that an unconstitutional program is "arguably justified" by practice, usage, and custom,17 imposing a judicial presumption that a disputed unconstitutional program is not
"arguably justified" takes seriously the Conrail dividing line between an "arguably justified" policy and a unilateral change in
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement while protecting
employees from violation of their rights.
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A MAJOR DISPUTE AND A
MINOR DISPUTE UNDER THE RLA

A.

The Definition of a Major Dispute Under the RLA

The RLA divides employer-employee disputes into two categories, commonly termed "major" and "minor." In defining a major dispute, the RLA provides that no carrier "shall change the
rates of pay, rules or working conditions of its employees, as a
class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements" or through the mediation procedures
set forth in the RLA. Is The Supreme Court has held that a major dispute
relates to disputes over the formation of collective
agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise where
there is no such agreement or where it is sought to
change the terms of one, and therefore the issue is not
whether an existing agreement controls the controversy.
They look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not

See generally Comment, Employee Drug Testing: Federal Courts Are Redefining
Individual Rights of Privacy, Will Labor ArbitratorsFollow Suit?, 44 U Miami L Rev 489
(1989) (arguing that a union is extremely likely to contest an employer's unilateral imposition of an unconstitutional drug testing program).
18 45 USC § 152(7).
17
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to assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the
past. 9
To resolve a major dispute, the parties must undergo a complex process of RLA-mandated bargaining and arbitration: "Until
they have exhausted those procedures, the parties are obligated
to maintain the status quo, and the employer may not implement
the contested change in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions."2° As a matter of law, the union may request a preliminary injunction to preserve the pre-dispute status quo.2 '
B. The Definition of a Minor Dispute Under the RLA
The RLA provides for compulsory NRAB arbitration of minor
disputes,22 defined as disputes that grow "out of grievances or
out of the interpretation or application of [existing] agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." Minor
disputes pertain to
"the existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no effort is made
to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a
new one. The dispute relates either to the meaning or
proper application of a particular provision with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case. In the
latter event the claim is founded upon some incident of
the employment relation, or asserted one, independent
of those covered by the collective agreement, e.g., claims
on account of personal injuries. In either case the claim
is to rights accrued, not merely to have new ones created
for the future."24
Unlike a major dispute, during which the union is entitled to
a preliminary injunction preserving the pre-dispute status quo,
during a minor dispute the court normally does not retain jurisConrail, 491 US at 302, quoting Elgin, J. & E. Railroad Co. v Burley, 325 US 711,
723 (1945).
2o Id at 302-03.
21 See Marion Crain, Expanded Employee Drug.Detection Programs and the Public
Good: Big Brother at the BargainingTable, 64 NYU L Rev 1286, 1299 (1989).
22 The RLA provides that "[a]minor dispute in the railroad industry is subject to
compulsory and binding arbitration before the [NRABI ...or before an adjustment board
established by the employer and the unions representing the employees." Conrail,491 US
at 303-04.
2' 45 USC § 152(6) and § 153(1)(i).
2 Conrail, 491 US at 303, quoting Burley, 325 US at 723 (emphasis added).
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diction to preserve the pre-dispute status quo.25 Conrail, however, left open the question of whether a court retains jurisdiction
to grant a preliminary injunction preserving the status quo in a
minor dispute where the disputed change may inflict irreparable
harm on employees by depriving them of their constitutional
26
rights.
II. THE CONRAIL "ARGUABLY JUSTIFIED" TEST
In ConsolidatedRail Corp. v Railway Labor Executives' Association,27 the Supreme Court established the "arguably justified"
standard for determining whether an employer-employee dispute
is major or minor under the RLA. The Conrail Court held that
"Iwhere an employer asserts a contractual right to take the contested action, the ensuing dispute is minor if the action is arguably justified by the terms of the parties' collective-bargaining
agreement. Where, in contrast, the employer's claims are frivolous or obviously insubstantial, the dispute is major. " 2 The Supreme Court stressed the "relatively light burden which the railroad must bear" in establishing that the dispute is minor and
thus subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NRAB.29
In Conrail, a railroad employees' union opposed the
railroad's unilateral imposition of urinalysis drug screening as
part of all periodic and return-from-leave physical examinations.3 ° The Court held that inclusion of drug testing in these
physical examinations was "arguably justified" by the implied
terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the railroad and the union, thus constituting a minor dispute within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NRAB.3 '
In holding that the railroad's testing scheme was arguably
justified, the Court first noted that "[clollective bargaining agreements often incorporate express or implied terms that are designed to give management, or the union, a degree of freedom of
action within a specified area of activity." 2 In addition, the
Court held that
Id at 304.
Id at 304 n 5.
2' 491 US 299 (1989) ("Conrail").
2' Id at 307.
2' Id, quoting Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, Lodge 16 v Burlington
N Railroad Co., 802 F2d 1016, 1022 (8th Cir 1986).
2
21

31

Id at 300.
Conrail, 491 US at 320.

32

Id at 308.

30
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if an employer asserts a claim that the parties' agreement gives the employer the discretion to make a particular change in working conditions without prior negotiation, and if that claim is arguably justified by the
terms of the parties' agreement (i.e., the claim is neither obviously insubstantial or frivolous, nor made in
bad faith), the employer may make the change and the
courts must defer to the arbitral jurisdiction of the
[NRAB 1.
Therefore, if an employer can demonstrate that an implied-in-fact
contractual term grants it discretion to make a particular change
or alteration in working conditions, then the dispute is minor. In
determining whether such an implied term exists, a court should
interpret the agreement in light of "'practice, usage, and custom.'"'
Observing that the plaintiff railroad had always required
periodic and return-to-duty physical examinations, and noting
that "[iun the past, the parties have left the establishment and
enforcement of medical standards in [the railroad's] hands,"35
the Conrail Court found an implied-in-fact agreement that the
railroad would determine the scope of such examinations.3 6
Thus, the minor dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the NRAB. 7
Significantly, because the railroad employees' union did not
allege irreparable harm in their request for injunctive relief, the
Conrail Court declined to resolve "whether a status quo injunction based on a claim of irreparable injury would be appropriate."" In a footnote, however, the Court alluded to a First Circuit case holding that a "union [might] be able to enjoin changes
in working conditions if it would be impossible otherwise later to
make the workers whole." 39 The Court also cited a case in which
Id at 310.
Id at 311, quoting Transportation.CommunicationEmployees Union v Union Pacific Railroad Co., 385 US 157, 161 (1966).
3'

34

Conrail, 491 US at 317.

Id at 317-20. See also Crain, 64 NYU L Rev at 1316-17 (cited in note 21) (observing
that in Conrail the Supreme Court accepted the argument that the employer could choose
its desired drug-testing methodology based upon an implied-in-fact term in the collective
bargaining agreement).
17 Id at 319.
' Id at 304

n 5. See also Air Line Pilots Association International v Alaska Airlines,
Inc., 898 F2d 1393, 1400 (9th Cir 1990) (Brunetti dissenting) (noting that under Conrail it
is uncertain whether a court retains jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction based
on the traditional showing of irreparable injury).
' Conrail, 491 US at 304 n 5, citing Air Line Pilots Association Internationalv East.
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the Sixth Circuit did not resolve whether a court could grant a
preliminary injunction in a minor dispute based on a showing of
irreparable harm.4"
The Conrail Court also declined to resolve whether the absence of "cause"41 in the railroad's testing justified enjoining the
testing on Fourth Amendment grounds.4" Instead, the Court
merely observed that "it is not the role of the courts to decide the
merits of the parties' dispute" in the context of a minor dispute.'
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF A PURELY RANDOM,
MANDATORY, AND SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING PROGRAM
If a public employer subject to the RLA unilaterally instituted a purely random, mandatory, and suspicionless drug testing
program, a court would likely find the testing scheme unconstitutional. However, if a court simultaneously held that the testing
program constituted a minor dispute under the Conrail "arguably
justified" test, the court would need to consider the appropriateness of preliminarily enjoining the employer from continuing the
unconstitutional testing program pending the NRAB's disposition
of the dispute.
The Supreme Court's Decisions in Skinner and Von Raab

A.

In two Supreme Court cases decided just months before Conrail, the Supreme Court ruled that suspicionless drug testing
violates the Fourth Amendment unless the testing serves a compelling government interest that outweighs the employees' interest in privacy. In Skinner v Railway Labor Executives' Association," railway labor organizations sued to enjoin regulations
promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA")
governing drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees.4 The
ern Air Lines, Inc., 869 F2d 1518, 1520 n 2 (DC Cir 1989).
40 Id, citing Division No. 1, Detroit, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v Consolidated Rail Corp., 844 F2d 1218, 1224 n 10 (6th Cir 1988).
" Under Skinner v Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 US 602 (1989), and
National Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab, 489 US 656 (1989), discussed at length
in Part III below, in certain contexts a public employer's imposition of a suspicionless
drug test (i.e. a test imposed in the absence of "cause") violates its employees' Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Skinner, 489 US at
620; Von Raab, 489 US at 669.
42 Conrail, 489 US at 318.
43

Id.

" 489 US 602 (1989).
4
In Skinner, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment, which protects the public
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Court ruled that drug and alcohol testing requiring "'compelled
intrusio[n] into the body'" constitutes a search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment."' However, the Court held that because
certain railroad employees engage in safety-sensitive tasks, the
government's interest in public safety constituted a "'special
nee[d]' justifying departure from the normal warrant and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.4 7 Therefore,
the drug and alcohol tests mandated by the FRA regulations
were deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 4 because a compelling governmental interest-public safety-outweighed the employees' privacy concerns.4 9
On the same day, in National Treasury Employees Union v
Von Raab, ° the Court held that the United States Customs
Service's drug testing program, which affected employees applying for promotions to drug-interdiction positions where they
would carry firearms, was subject to the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement.5 1 However, the Court found that
the government's compelling interest in ensuring that front-line
interdiction personnel are physically fit and have unimpeachable
integrity and judgment outweighed the agents' privacy interests.52 Thus, despite the absence of individual suspicion or probable cause, the drug testing survived scrutiny under the Fourth
Amendment."
Together, Skinner and Von Raab stand for the proposition
that, unless a compelling governmental interest such as public
safety outweighs employees' privacy interests, a mandatory and
suspicionless drug testing program does not satisfy the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement. Thus, if a public em-

from unreasonable searches and seizures, applied to the FRA regulations; railroads comply with the governmental rules under threat of law and are therefore viewed as agents of
the government. Skinner, 489 US at 615-16. The effect of this ruling is that private sector
employers subject to such regulations are treated as "public sector employers" for purposes of constitutional analysis.
" Skinner, 489 US at 616, quoting Schmerber v California, 384 US 757, 767-68
(1966).
'7 Id at 620, quoting Griffin v Wisconsin, 483 US 868, 873-74 (1987).
48 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence dictates that a warrant or reasonable suspicion
is normally required before a drug test can be imposed on an unconsenting subject. Of
course, where a sufficiently compelling governmental interest exists, individualized suspicion is not a prerequisite. Skinner, 489 US at 619, 624.
'9

Id at 633.

'0 489 US 656 (1989).

Id at 665.

82

Id at 669-70.

"

Id.
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ployer subject to the RLA unilaterally imposed a purely random,54 mandatory, and suspicionless program on its employees
absent a compelling governmental interest, then the program
would be unconstitutional with respect to those employees occupying non-safety-sensitive positions.5 5
B.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals' Decisions in Transport
Workers' Union and Bolden

The Supreme Court has not specifically considered whether a
public sector employer's imposition of a purely random, mandatory, and suspicionless drug testing program violates its employees'
Fourth Amendment rights. However, two recent decisions by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reiterated
that a valid public safety concern must exist before such a testing
program will pass constitutional muster.
In Transport Workers' Union of Philadelphia,Local 234 v SE
Pa. TransportationAuthority," which was reconsidered in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in Conrail, the Third Circuit
held that a random drug testing program is constitutionally valid
only where (1) adequate safeguards protect the workers' privacy
rights, and (2) a compelling public safety concern is present.5 7 In
Bolden v SE Pa. TransportationAuthority," the same court held
that the transportation authority's imposition of a mandatory,
suspicionless drug test on a maintenance worker was unconstitutional, absent suspicion of drug use or a public or worker safety
concern related to the janitor's employment tasks.5 9
In neither Transport Workers' Union nor Bolden did the
Third Circuit establish a specific test to determine when an
employee's job raises a public or worker safety concern; rather,
the determination is seemingly made on a case-by-case basis.
Taken together, however, the cases make clear that a public
employer's unilateral imposition of a purely random, mandatory,
and suspicionless drug test violates the affected employees'
Fourth Amendment rights.

5' As noted above, a "purely random" drug test does not distinguish between employees occupying safety-sensitive positions and other employees. See note 15.
" For example, if such a test were imposed upon janitors in a transit authority's
administrative offices, then the test would not be justified by any pressing public safety
concern and would violate these employees' Fourth Amendment rights.
884 F2d 709 (3d Cir 1988).
Id at 711-12.
'8

953 F2d 807 (3d Cir 1991).

Id at 822-24.
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IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF PRELIMINARILY ENJOINING A DRUG
TESTING PROGRAM DURING A MINOR DISPUTE

Given that a public employer's unilateral imposition of a
purely random, mandatory, and suspicionless drug testing program is unconstitutional, employees subject to the program could
normally establish a likelihood of irreparable harm, thereby allowing a court to grant a preliminary injunction.' Under Conrail, however, a court would classify a dispute arising from such
a testing policy as minor if it believed that the program were "arguably justified." 1 Under the RLA, once a court characterizes a
dispute as minor, it loses jurisdiction: the dispute falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NRAB."2 When a court loses jurisdiction, it normally may not issue a preliminary injunction. However, the Conrail Court left unresolved whether, after classifying
a dispute as minor, a court can grant a preliminary injunction
preserving the pre-dispute status quo.63
Since Conrail, none of the circuits have applied the Conrail
"arguably justified" test to a dispute arising over a public
employer's unilateral imposition of an unconstitutional drug testing program. Three courts, however, have addressed whether it
would be appropriate to enjoin a drug testing program during a
minor dispute where the affected employees have successfully
established that they would suffer irreparable harm if injunctive
relief were denied.
In Railway Labor Executives' Association v Metro-North Commuter Railroad,' the District Court for the Southern District of
New York followed Conrail in ruling that, in light of practice,
usage, and custom, periodic and return'from-leave drug testing
constituted a minor dispute.6 Although the court declined to

' Although the requirements vary among the circuits, the general elements a movant
must establish for a court to grant a preliminary injunction are that: (1) movant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) movant is likely to succeed on
the merits; (3) the harm to the movant if the injunction is not granted outweighs the
harm to the opposing party if the injunction is granted; and (4) the injunction benefits the
public interest. 7 Moore's Federal Practice 65.04[1], at 32-33 (Matthew Bender, 1994).
With respect to the irreparable harm element, the deprivation of constitutional rights generally constitutes irreparable injury justifying a preliminary injunction. Id at 59-60. See
also Elrod v Burns, 427 US 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion emphasizing that violation
of First Amendment rights for even one minute constitutes irreparable injury).
e' Conrail,491 US at 319. See note 37 and accompanying text.
82

Conrail, 491 US at 304.

See notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
759 F Supp 1019 (S D NY 1990).
6'Id at 1022.
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enjoin the employer from implementing the disputed drug testing
program, the court nevertheless declared that in an appropriate
case a court should grant a preliminary injunction preserving the
pre-dispute status quo pending arbitration.66 In particular, the
court suggested that it would have enjoined the employer if the
employees had been able to establish that they would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted. 7
Similarly, in Allied Pilots Association v American Airlines,
Inc.,' the Fifth Circuit, following Conrail, scrutinized the past
practices of the employer and employees in addition to the language of their collective bargaining agreement to determine that
a dispute between an airline and the pilots' union over the
airline's alcohol testing procedures was minor. 9 Reversing the
district court's grant of a preliminary injunction, the court stated
that the possibility of irreparable harm to an employee's reputation is insufficient to warrant preliminary injunctive relief.70 In
so holding, however, the court suggested that if the plaintiff had
established more substantial irreparable harm, then preliminary
injunctive relief would have been appropriate.7
Finally, in Air Line Pilots Association, Internationalv Alaska
Airlines, Inc.,72 the Ninth Circuit ruled that a dispute over a
policy requiring mandatory drug testing without notice after an
employee tested positive for drug use in a test based upon reasonable suspicion constituted a minor dispute; past practice demonstrated that the employees consented to the prior suspicionbased drug testing. Refusing to reconsider the district court's
denial of a preliminary injunction, the court stated: "[Wie uphold
the district court's determination that the evidence presented did
not indicate a sufficient likelihood of [the plaintiff] prevailing on
the merits to grant the preliminary injunction." 3
Dissenting inAir Line Pilots, however, Judge Brunetti correctly noted that the majority opinion failed to separate the juris-

Id at 1023.
67

Id.

6898 F2d 462 (5th Cir 1990).
Id at 465.
70 Id at 465-66.
" Id. See also InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers of American.Airline Div. & Teamsters Local 19 v SW Airlines Co., 875 F2d 1129,
1136 (5th Cir 1989) (holding that to grant a status quo injunction, the employee must
demonstrate substantial irreparable harm).
72 898 F2d 1393 (9th Cir 1990) ("Air Line Pilots").
13 Id at 1397.
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dictional issue at hand from resolution on the merits. Judge
Brunetti stated:
I dissent from the majority opinion because it characterizes the decision on whether a dispute is "minor," under
the Railway Labor Act.

.

., as a decision on the merits.

This decision is clearly jurisdictional, not a decision on
the merits. Once the district court determined, as a
matter of law, that the dispute was minor, the district
court properly held that it had no jurisdiction to consider the merits of appellants' claim or to grant injunctive
relief under the RLA. The district court also properly
denied appellant's, request for an injunction based on
traditional, equitable principles.74
The district court had first determined that the dispute was
minor, and it had then considered whether to grant a preliminary
injunction based on traditional equitable principles, namely "a
showing of 'irreparable injury' and the probability of success on
the merits."75 At the appellate level, the majority also denied the
injunction as part of its inquiry into the merits of the case,76
thereby conflating the purely jurisdictional nature of the major/minor determination with resolution of the dispute on the
merits.
Judge Brunetti's dissenting opinion in Air Line Pilots correctly explains that once a court classifies a dispute as minor, it no
longer retains jurisdiction over the case. This argument is extremely potent: once a court classifies the dispute as minor, the
case immediately falls under the jurisdiction of the NRAB, and a
court cannot subsequently grant a preliminary injunction.77
Moreover, a court certainly cannot grant a preliminary injunction before classifying the dispute as minor. Although the
legislative history of the RLA is silent on this issue, one of the
obvious purposes behind the major/minor dispute classification
system is to ensure that disputes are resolved in the forum Congress has designated. If a court were to grant a preliminary injunction preserving the status quo before classifying the dispute

Id at 1398 (Brunetti dissenting).
Id (Brunetti dissenting).
7' Air Line Pilots, 898 F2d at 1396-1400 (Brunetti dissenting).
Significantly, Judge Brunetti also expressly observed that under Conrail"ilt is not
clear whether the court had jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction, pending the
decision on the merits by the Board, based on the traditional showing of 'irreparable
harm.' Id at 1400 (Brunetti dissenting).
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as minor, then the court would undermine the jurisdictional aspect of the major/minor distinction. Congress determined that
when a court characterizes a dispute as minor, it loses jurisdiction. Thus, if a significant reason exists for a court to retain jurisdiction even after characterizing the dispute as minor, it is
likely that Congress did not intend for such a dispute to be classified as minor in the first place.
V. A COURT FACED WITH THIS ISSUE SHOULD IMPOSE A
PRESUMPTION THAT A DISPUTED UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROGRAM IS
NOT "ARGUABLY JUSTIFIED" AND THUS THAT THE DISPUTE IS

MAJOR
A court confronted with an RLA dispute arising from a public employer's unilateral imposition of a purely random, mandatory, and suspicionless drug testing program faces a serious dilemma. Because the drug testing program does not further a compelling governmental interest such as public safety, the testing
clearly violates the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. Because employees suffer irreparable harm when deprived
of their constitutional rights, normally they can seek a court's
protection by requesting a preliminary injunction.7" Under the
RLA, however, a court initially possesses jurisdiction over the
employer-employee dispute only for the purpose of classifying the
dispute as major or minor. Therefore, if the dispute is minor
under the Conrail "arguably justified" test, then the court does
not have the authority to grant a preliminary injunction. Can a
court nevertheless protect the employees from suffering irreparable harm pending the NRAB's disposition of the dispute?
This Comment recommends that in order to protect such
employees, a court facing this issue should presume that the
disputed program is not "arguably justified" and thus that the
dispute is major, thereby preserving the pre-dispute status
quo.79 Since Conrail, the courts have endeavored where possible
to read an implied-in-fact term authorizing implementation of
drug testing programs into existing collective bargaining agreements, thus classifying the disputes as minor.' However, this
See note 60 and accompanying text.
7' This Comment recommends more than that a court should presume that the disputed program is not "arguably justified." This Comment proposes that when a dispute
arises over the unilateral imposition of any clearly unconstitutional program, a court
should presume that the disputed program is not "arguably justified" except under the
specific circumstances discussed below.
' See, for example, Allied Pilots, 898 F2d at 464-65; Metro.N Commuter, 759 F Supp
78
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approach is inappropriate in situations where a unilaterally imposed drug testing program violates employees' constitutional
rights. Given the nature of the potential harm, it is illogical to
assume that employees have contractually waived their Fourth
Amendment rights based upon practice, usage, and custom where
such practice, usage, and custom did not implicate the employees'
constitutional rights. In situations where employees establish
that they will suffer irreparable harm through violation of their
constitutional rights, a court applying the Conrail "arguably justified" test should impose a rebuttable presumption that the disputed drug testing program is not "arguably justified." An employer may rebut the presumption only if the testing program is
explicitly articulated in the collective bargaining agreement or if
practice, usage, and custom clearly signify the employees' contractual waiver of their rights."1
Imposing a presumption that the disputed program is not
"arguably justified" makes sense for five reasons: (1) the presumption yields the correct legal ruling because it is unlikely
that employees impliedly consent contractually to the unilateral
imposition of an unconstitutional testing program; (2) the presumption creates economic incentives encouraging both parties to
negotiate the issue ex ante, thereby avoiding the dispute altogether; (3) the presumption is inexpensive to institute and administer; (4) the presumption satisfies equitable considerations; and (5)
the presumption is the best available alternative for resolution of
this issue.
First, it is highly unlikely that employees impliedly consent
to the unilateral imposition of unconstitutional drug testing programs. Where an employer and a union negotiate a collective
bargaining agreement, the employees' contractual waiver of a
constitutional right represents a major negotiating issue. To preserve its rights under the agreement, an employer would probably insist upon the express memorialization of any such employee
waiver within the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore,

at 1022.
" Simply classifying the dispute as major would not comport with the manner in
which courts have applied the Conrailtest. As presently applied, the Conrailtest virtually demands classifying disputes as minor. See note 80 and accompanying text. For equitable reasons, this Comment essentially proposes that courts apply a different standard to
this category of disputes. In particular, as discussed below, applying a less permissive
standard by means of imposing a presumption produces the correct legal result in an efficient manner without interfering with the normally smooth functioning of the Conrail
test.
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where a court finds that the bargaining agreement does not contain an express waiver of a constitutional right, it should recognize the limited value of examining practice, usage, and custom
to determine whether the disputed change is "arguably justified"
by the agreement, especially in situations where past practices
have not raised constitutional issues. A presumption that the
disputed program is not "arguably justified" recognizes that practice, usage, and custom are not sufficiently probative in this context to warrant classifying the dispute as minor unless the employees expressly contractually waived their Fourth Amendment
rights in the past.
Second, establishing a presumption that the disputed program is not "arguably justified" creates the proper economic incentives. Resolution of a major dispute is more time-consuming
and more expensive than resolution of a minor dispute.8 2 Therefore, if parties know ex ante that a court will presume the disputed program is not "arguably justified" unless an explicit term in
the collective bargaining agreement contradicts this presumption,
then the employer and the union will vigorously bargain over and
explicitly document any such drug testing program before finalizing future collective bargaining agreements, thereby avoiding the
potentially high costs associated with resolving a major dispute.
Third, this presumption is inexpensive to institute and administer. s3 For the most part, the Conrail "arguably justified"
test works extremely well in practice. As noted above, the Conrail test renders it extremely easy for an employer to show that a
program is "arguably justified" in light of practice, usage, and
custom. Such a low threshold reduces litigation costs for both
parties and lowers the court's fact-finding costs. It also creates an
incentive for both parties to avoid costly disputes by carefully
negotiating the terms of collective bargaining agreements. Similarly, instituting a presumption that the disputed program is not
"arguably justified" is also efficient because such a presumption
functions as a predictable, bright-line rule around which both
employers and unions can structure their bargaining activities.
At the same time, instituting the presumption does not interfere
with the normally smooth functioning of the Conrail test because

82 Crain, 64 NYU L Rev at 1296-97 (cited in note 21).
'3 This argument assumes that both parties negotiate over this program ex ante. If
both parties do not negotiate ex ante, then the presumption will actually increase costs because of the increased cost of resolving a major dispute. The danger of this increased cost,
however, will serve as an incentive to both parties to negotiate over this program ex ante.
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the presumption applies only to a limited number of readily-identifiable cases.
Fourth, the presumption that the disputed program is not
"arguably justified" is an equitable solution to a pressing legal
problem: it vindicates employees' Fourth Amendment rights without requiring them to suffer irreparable harm pending NRAB
resolution of the dispute. Furthermore, because the presumption
is rebuttable, it also accommodates those rare cases in which
employees have, in fact, contractually waived their Fourth
Amendment rights. An employer can easily rebut this presumption if it can point to a provision in the collective bargaining
agreement expressly waiving the right." An employer can also
rebut the presumption in situations where a court properly finds
that employees clearly waived their rights based on practice,
usage, and custom. 5
Finally, the alternative resolution of this issue - granting a
preliminary injunction preserving the pre-dispute status quo - is
improper. It seems likely that the Conrail Court refused to pass
on whether a status-quo injunction in a minor dispute might
function as an appropriate remedy in part to preclude subsequent
courts from issuing a preliminary injunction where the court no
longer retained jurisdiction. Allowing a preliminary injunction
after a court classifies the dispute as minor contradicts the jurisdictional aspect of the major/minor dispute distinction."6
Moreover, if a court were first to classify a dispute as minor
and then to issue a preliminary injunction preserving the predispute status quo, granting the injunction would imply that the
court did not believe that the dispute was minor in the first
place. Instead, it must have believed that the employees expressly or impliedly consented contractually to the unconstitutional

Constitutional rights may be waived by contract where the facts and circumstances
surrounding the waiver establish that the waiving party waived its rights of its own volition, with full understanding of the consequences of its waiver. Erie Telecommunications,
Inc. v City of Erie, Pa., 853 F2d 1084 (3d Cir 1988).
It is not particularly easy to imagine such a situation. Perhaps where the employees have given consent to the imposition of a similarly unconstitutional test, then a dispute over a different unconstitutional drug test should be classified as minor. However,
this argument holds only if the employees have waived their rights after the collective
bargaining agreement has taken effect. If the employees have expressly waived their
rights within the collective bargaining agreement, then the fact that a waiver of the right
to object to the new test is not memorialized in the agreement suggests that the employees have not impliedly consented to the imposition of such a test. The memorialization of
the first waiver suggests a custom that all waivers must be included within the express
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
" See Section IV.
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program, thereby waiving their Fourth Amendment rights and
thus their right to a preliminary injunction to prevent irreparable harm. A court would be behaving inconsistently if on the one
hand it classified the dispute as minor and on the other hand it
found that the employees might suffer irreparable harm pending
the dispute's disposition by the NRAB.
CONCLUSION

If required to classify a dispute arising from a public
employer's imposition of a purely random, mandatory, and
suspicionless drug testing program under the RLA, a court
should protect employees against violation of their Fourth
Amendment rights. The best method to accomplish this goal is
for a court to presume that the disputed unconstitutional test is
not "arguably justified" unless explicitly articulated in the collective bargaining agreement or unless practice, usage, and custom
clearly signify the employees' contractual waiver of their rights.
Imposing this presumption, and thus classifying the dispute as
major, preserves the status quo before the testing program was
instituted, thereby enjoining the testing pending NRAB scrutiny.
Classifying the dispute as major also recognizes that such testing
is so inherently intrusive that it would be illogical for a court to
find that employees contractually submitted to such testing
through an implied-in-fact term in their collective bargaining
agreement. Finally, this presumption creates the proper incentives for avoiding the dispute in the first place by encouraging
both sides to negotiate and memorialize the specifics of a drug
testing program before signing the collective bargaining agreement.

